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ABSTRACT 
We introduce a recent development in the statistical analysis of relational data that offers 
rigorous discrimination of a variety of structural and behavioural effects of interest to 
management research. Exponential random graph models account for the highly 
interdependent nature of network data that are problematic for the predominant inferential 
statistical analysis used in management research. We illustrate the value of the approach 
with an application focused on executive recruitment by large UK firms, modelling 
migrations of managers among firms as a network of relationships. We find rigorous 
statistical support for the influences of industry origin in executive recruitment, particularly 
in relation to legal and accounting activities. The flexibility and sophisticated relational 
variables available in the models offer considerable analytical power of value to a wide 
range of management applications. 
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RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS 
 Exponential random graph models (ERGMs) are used as a potentially fruitful analytical 
method for management research. 
 Conventional regression models have limitations in the analysis of highly interdependent 
data such as network data. 
 Case study of an application of ERGMs in explaining drivers of executive recruitment by 
large UK firms is presented. 
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1. Introduction1 
The network paradigm has become increasingly prominent in contemporary management 
research (Carpenter, Li, & Jiang, 2012; Kilduff & Brass, 2010). Organizations and their 
participants are now frequently conceptualized as socially embedded, with organizational 
activity seen to have extra-organizational influences and impacts, often via persistent repeated 
social interactions or networks. However, as the interdependence among and between actors and 
organizational settings has become more recognized, questions of causality have become more 
complex. To what extent do people shape networks or are people shaped by them? If there is co-
evolution of people and networks, how does this unfold (Tasselli, Kilduff, & Menges, 2015)? 
Management research has given little attention to these questions when considering 
social embeddedness, instead normally simply testing the effect of the presence of network ties 
via a count of the number of ties (e.g., Li, Popo, & Zhou, 2008). Alternatively, structural 
approaches give attention to the characteristics of the network in which the actor or organization 
is embedded and their position within it, providing opportunities and constraints that may 
                                                
 
1 Abbreviations used in this paper: 
ERGM – exponential random graph model. 
GoF – goodness of fit. 
NACE – statistical classification of economic activities in the European Community 
(Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté européenne). 
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determine organizational activity or channel effects of the activity outward, such as the diffusion 
of innovation. Social network analytic techniques are typically employed to derive a metric 
indicator of network position for use as an independent variable; many studies, for example, 
have found actor or organizational performance in various forms associated with the network 
metric betweenness centrality (e.g., Burt, 1992; Flynn & Wiltermuth, 2010). 
The use of indicators of network position as independent variables in standard inferential 
statistics is problematic, however, because of the highly interdependent nature of relational data; 
by definition, such data are not independent nor are the distributions of network ties generally 
known. Standard inferential statistics, widely used in management research, infers properties of 
a population from those of a sample on the assumption that both the population and the sample 
meet a known distribution and each variable has independent effects on the variable of interest. 
Thus, network data require distinctive analytical treatment both in terms of statistical analysis 
and in distinguishing structural (network-originating) and selection (actor-originating) effects. 
In this paper, we report a recently developed method that appears well positioned to meet 
the challenges in analyzing relational data in management research. Exponential random graph 
models (ERGMs) comprise an increasingly popular method in social network analysis to more 
rigorously model associations among interdependent data than conventional approaches. 
ERGMs provide an alternative approach to statistical analysis that can accommodate 
interdependent data and does not require a priori knowledge or assumptions about sample and 
population distributions. The models also provide for explicit testing of distinct structural and 
selection effects. 
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Following an introduction and description of ERGMs, we provide a case study applying 
the method to a problem in managerial research to model determinants of the movements of 
executives from one company to another. This problem, traditionally addressed as executive 
recruitment by an autonomous firm, is modelled as a network of movements of executives 
among firms – recruitment simultaneously filling a vacancy but creating another elsewhere. 
 
2. The ERGM framework 
A characteristic of the highly interdependent data found in networks is that small changes 
in connections can have large effects on network structure and the distribution of ties varies 
greatly from network to network. Outside some attempts to model ‘scale-free’ distributions 
approached in very large networks (Barabási, 2000), no a priori assumptions can be made about 
the distribution of ties in a network. Thus, unlike standard inferential statistics, the 
characteristics of a network as a whole or the significance of relationships amongst variables 
cannot be inferred by comparing patterns in the observed data with those in a standard 
distribution. 
In addition, network data, by definition, is highly interdependent and these dependencies 
are commonly maintained or reinforced by social processes such as reciprocation. It is difficult 
to isolate individual actor behaviour from the influences of those an actor is connected to. Thus, 
the observed variables typically lack independence, violating another assumption of standard 
inferential statistics. Analysis of network data by conventional inferential methods thus tends to 
generate spurious relationships among variables, resulting in type I errors (Borgatti, Everett, & 
Johnson, 2013; Snijders, van de Bunt, & Steglich, 2010). 
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ERGMs employ permutation-based approaches to overcome these limitations of 
conventional statistical analysis. Rather than assuming independence and a particular 
distribution of observations, each observed variable is compared with a large number of random 
permutations of values to determine the extent to which the observation persistently differs from 
randomness, providing a rigorous measure of statistical significance (Dekker et al, 2007). The 
approach allows the combination of structural variables (network statistics such as directed ties, 
mutual ties, transitivity paths and particular microstructures) and actor variables (characteristics 
of individual actors such as industry, value added or revenue of firm and dyadic selection 
processes such as reciprocity) into a single model, thus allowing the discrimination of relative 
structural and selection effects (Robins et al, 2007). 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Figure 1 presents some examples of the structural configurations and selection processes 
that can be included in an ERGM alongside conventional actor variables, such as revenue. The 
first row provides examples of structural configurations. Inclusion of a) as a variable allows us to 
test the extent to which the configuration of the observed network is likely to have arisen from 
distribution of arcs in the network. The count of outward ties, ‘outdegree’ or ‘sources’; inward 
ties, ‘indegree’ or ‘sinks’; and isolates are important characteristics of a network structure. In a 
similar manner, we can look for other particular microstructures such as b), c) or d) and test the 
extent to which each of these is likely to have contributed to the observed network configuration. 
The second row of Fig. 1 provides examples of dyadic social selection variables, where 
network ties arise from the characteristics of the actors. In e) the originator or ‘sender’ of the 
relationship possesses an attribute while the ‘receiver’ does not. With continuous variables, this 
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can be interpreted as representing greater amounts of the attribute. In f), the receiver possesses 
an attribute that the sender does not, a social interaction described as ‘popularity’. In g), the 
possessor of an attribute forms a relationship with another possessing the same attribute, 
‘homophily.’ In h), a popular relationship is reciprocated. 
The third row of Fig. 1 provides some extensions where attributes are continuous 
variables, which can nuance the selection effects just described. In i), the absolute difference 
between the sender and receiver is used as a parameter, indicating heterophily. In j), nodes with 
higher total values in an attribute tend to tie together. In k), nodes with a higher product of 
values tend to tie together. In l), nodes with a higher attribute tend to both receive ties and send 
ties. Attribute-based ‘instar’ and ‘outstar’ relationships are also readily modelled. 
In this manner, quite elaborate configurations of social interaction can be constructed and 
tested. Elaborations include ‘4-step cycles’, ‘social circuits’, ‘attribute-based centralisation’, 
‘degree assortivity’ and cross-level effects. Wang, Robins and Pattison (2009), in their PNet 
implementation of ERGMs, provide a comprehensive categorization of structural, dyadic and 
selection variables, with Wang et al (2016) discussing extensions for modelling multilevel 
networks. Other implementations include the Statnet package for R (Handcock et al, 2003) and 
the PyMC library for Python (Fonnesbeck et al, 2015). 
ERGMs can be more formally considered as allowing the representation of a network as 
a graph 𝐺, in terms of summary measures 𝑧(𝐺) the network statistics. In mathematical terms 
(Robins & Lusher, 2013b), an ERGM assigns probabilities to a given graph 𝐺 with respect to 
these statistics, such that the weighted average of the 𝑍𝑠 can be stated as 
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𝑃𝜽(𝐺) = 𝑐𝑒
𝜃1𝑧1(𝐺)+𝜃2𝑧2(𝐺)+⋯+𝜃𝑝𝑧𝑝(𝐺)       (1) 
 
Expression (1) tells us that the probability of a graph 𝐺 depends on the number of 
configurations (network statistics) or some Z functions of them, where 𝜃𝑠 are their parameters 
and 𝑐 is a normalized constant (Robins & Lusher, 2013b). Since the inferential goal is to find 
data’s maximal support under 𝑧(𝐺), the estimation of (1) implies solving for the moments 
equation of 𝜽 via maximum likelihood estimation. Because of natural data dependencies, this is 
usually done numerically; in our case, it was done by employing a stochastic approximation 
technique (the Robbins-Monro algorithm) as explained in Koskinen and Snijders (2013), which 
is solved via convergence to stable values. 
It is also important to clarify that the goodness-of fit (GoF) in ERGMs is called a 
heuristic GoF, which is a simulation of how central or extreme non-fitted effects are in the 
distribution of the ERGM in equation (1) compared with fitted effects, such that if the graph 
feature is not extreme, this might have arisen from the estimated model and so it could be 
explained by the model. The approximate critical value is |t−ratio|< 2.0; thus, any value outside 
this range is considered extreme and hence not a representable graph under the model examined 
(Koskinen & Snijders, 2013). 
Studies applying ERGMs to management research are relatively recent and scarcely 
reported. The focus has been on general knowledge transfer, particularly on intra-organizational 
learning (see for example Skerlavaj, Dimovski & Desouza, 2010; Su, Huang & Contractor, 
2010) and inter-organizational learning as in Broekel and Hartog (2013), Harris et al (2012) and 
Lomi and Palotti (2011, 2012). Focardi, Cincotti and Marchesi (2002) apply ERGMs in financial 
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markets and Lomi and Fonti (2012) use ERGMs to examine the structural effects of alliances in 
product markets. 
3. An application of ERGMs to executive recruitment 
The recruitment of an executive manager by a firm not only entails the import of a 
particular set of individual capabilities but also potentially transfers strategic and organizational 
knowledge (Brymer, Molloy, & Gilbert, 2014; Collings, Scullion, & Morley, 2007; Grimshaw & 
Miozzo, 2009; Hansen & Alewell, 2013; Koch & McGrath, 1996). In this sense, the value of an 
external executive appointment is derived from both the characteristics of the individual 
transferring and the context from which they come (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Bailey & Helfat, 
2003; Castanias & Helfat, 2001). Thus, the characteristics of the firm from which an executive 
originates are a constituent in the subsequent change in value-added capabilities of the recruiting 
firm. We argue that the complementarity of the origin and recruiting firms and industries is 
particularly influential in this relationship because decision-making environments can differ 
greatly, as for example between cement manufacturing and software development. 
The recruiting and originating firms, however, do not comprise the full extent of the 
originating and recruiting context as the movement of an executive from one firm to another in 
the recruitment process fills a vacancy at the recruiting firm and typically creates one at the 
originating firm. This vacancy in turn is typically filled by creating a vacancy at another firm; 
therefore, executive recruitment can be conceived as a network of executive transfers among 
firms (White, 1970). 
Thus, where determinants of executive recruitment have traditionally been analysed with 
the originating context as independent exogenous variables, ERGMs allow the originating and 
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recruiting context to be modelled as endogenous effects of position within a network of 
transfers. This makes much greater use of the richness of the available data, albeit with a limited 
exploration in this illustration. 
 
3.1 Knowledge transfer as a driver of executive recruitment 
 Beyond the particular skills and know-how that individual executive managers bring to a 
recruiting firm, executive migration provides the potential for rich transfer of strategic and 
organizational knowledge, providing a mechanism for imitation or rapid catch-up with rivals 
(Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Dokko & Gaba, 2012; Kraatz & Moore, 
2002; Rao & Drazin, 2002). External recruitment is also valuable as a source of additional, 
complementary or diverse capabilities and as a catalyst for new cognitive models. The 
capabilities and knowledge imported may be novel, complementary or better match the firm’s 
needs (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Castanias & Helfat, 2001; Datta & 
Rajagopalan, 1998). External managerial appointments also reconfigure a firm’s external 
relationships to some degree, transferring from the originating firm to the receiving firm a set of 
interpersonal relationships between the two, with the migrating manager as the intermediary 
(Broschak, 2004; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973; Rider, 2012). In each of these areas, the experience, 
knowledge and relationships at the firm of origin in part constitute the capabilities imported. 
 The potential benefits of external managerial recruitment may be offset by information 
asymmetry risks compared to proven capabilities of internal candidates, insufficient firm-
specific knowledge or organizational disruption in the transition (Ballinger & Marcel, 2010; 
Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993; Greiner, Cummings, & Bhambri, 2002; Harris & Helfat, 1997). On 
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the contrary, internal appointment may reinforce existing suboptimal practices, limit exposure to 
different opportunities and have less influence on their peers than very experienced or 
prestigious outsiders (Finkelstein, 1992; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; Hambrick, 2007). 
 This potential benefits from external executive recruitment are realizable though only to 
the extent that these are made available and are transferable to the recipient organization, that is, 
particularly where they provide complementary capabilities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dokko 
& Gaba, 2012; Lane et al, 2006; Zahra & George, 2002). Where this occurs, executive migration 
is well positioned to overcome deeply entrenched routines and practices and vested interests that 
may limit knowledge transfer between organizations through weaker channels. This is 
particularly true where the migrants transfer from high-prestige or long-tenure settings, 
conferring status and authority on the migrant (Still & Strang, 2009). Knowledge transfer is also 
more likely to be sought in unstable conditions, where institutional or industry norms prove less 
reliable (Kraatz & Moore, 2002) or innovations are desired as ‘shocks to the system’ (Kotabe & 
Swan, 1995). 
 Our argument is that the potential for strategic and organizational knowledge transfer 
from the originating firm, at least in the long term, is recognized to some extent by recruiting 
firms. For the reasons outlined above, we think this is most likely where the migrating executive 
holds complementary capabilities and where they have status to transform existing routines and 
practices. In both cases, this is more likely when the transfer is from long tenure at a high-
prestige origin firm but where there is cognitive compatibility between the previous experience 
and the new one (Still & Strang, 2009). 
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 From a resource dependency perspective (Pfeffer & Salacnick, 1978), in stable 
conditions, the strategic capabilities sought are likely to be found within the same industry; 
however, in less stable conditions, experience in strategically important sectors (government, 
banking, finance) would be valued (Fligstein 1990; Kraatz & Moore, 2002; Pfeffer & Leblebici 
1973). In an era of increasing attention to shareholder value, we extend the notion of broadly 
strategically valuable sectors to professional business services more generally, such as 
accounting and legal services. Partners in large, prestigious auditing and legal services firms will 
be especially attractive because of their specialist know-how in protecting shareholder interests, 
particularly in highly regulated or financially dependent firms (Cronin, 2006; Lipartito, 1990, 
1998; Nelson et al, 1988). 
 Executive recruitment, then, is likely to be influenced by particular characteristics of the 
originating firm and industry complementing the strategic needs of the recruiting firm, and such 
recruitment should be reflected in increased shareholder value at the recruiting firm. Recruiters 
will favour executives drawn from complementary industries and firms with high profitability 
(Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012; Lo et al, 2011; Pazzaglia, Flynn, & Sonpar, 2012) as a 
means of importing value-adding capabilities. 
H1: In executive recruitment, there is a positive relationship between the source firm’s 
prior financial performance and the likelihood of hiring from that firm. 
H2: In executive recruitment, there is a positive relationship between the source firm’s 
industry complementarity and the likelihood of hiring from that firm. 
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3.2 Data and sample selection 
We drew data on executive employment by firm, firm financial indicators and firm 
industrial classification from Bureau Van Dijk’s database Orbis for the 250 largest UK firms by 
operating revenue in 2006 and the 250 largest in 2011. This spanned a period of unstable 
conditions in the UK economy, sufficient to capture performance effects on shareholder value 
(Marshall and Heffes, 2006). 
From the firm ‘contacts’ listings in the Orbis database, we compiled a cohort of 1841 
executive managers of the 2006 firms by screening according to conventional executive job 
titles. We repeated this for the 2011 firms and then matched executives in both datasets who had 
moved to a distinct firm, that is, where the executive’s full name and date of birth were identical 
in the 2006 and 2011 data and the 2011 firm differed by name from the 2006 firm. 
We excluded matches between firms related by ownership, which could represent 
internal transfer, that is, if the 2011 firm had changed name from the 2006 firm, if the 2011 firm 
was a subsidiary of the 2006 firm or if both firms had a common global ultimate owner. This left 
174 executives in the 2006 group who were serving as executives in distinct firms in the 2011 
group, that is, 174 dyadic relationships between a 2006 firm and a 2011 firm, the relationship 
comprising the migration of an executive from one firm to another. A number of originating and 
recruiting firms were involved in multiple and chained dyadic relationships, forming a network 
of inter-firm migrations, as illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. 
<INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE> 
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3.3 Model specification 
 As presented in equation (1), exponential random graph modelling attempts to maximize 
the likelihood that a particular set of graphical configurations 𝜃 is associated with the observed 
network (graph G); that is, it aims to find the maximum likelihood estimation of 𝜽. ERGMs 
adjust the distribution in equation (1) to diverse network patterns 𝑧(𝐺), including both structural 
and firm-level variables. 
As confirmed by some preliminary empirical testing, the sparseness and limited structure 
evident in the entire network illustrated in Fig. 2 are unlikely to arise from a particular set of 
structural characteristics; the large number of isolated dyadic relationships could have any 
number of drivers. Therefore, consistent with the predominant research strategy in social 
network analysis, we concentrated the analysis on the largest maximally connected 
subcomponent of 58 firms (Figure 3). 
The principal firm-level financial variable as a measure of firm performance and 
associated driver of executive recruitment is derived from the weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC). Executive managers actively participate in executive board-level strategic decisions 
related to firm growth opportunities. WACC is the central focus of discussion of such growth 
opportunities within a shareholder value perspective. 
The specific firm-level variable used in the estimation is residual income, a method of 
valuing a company calculated following a standard model (Brealey, Myers & Allen, 2011) from 
averages for the period 2002–2006 for originating firms and 2007–2011 for recruiting firms: 
𝑹𝑰 = (𝑅𝑂𝐸 − 𝑟)𝐼𝐶       (2) 
where 
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RI: Average Residual Income 
ROE: Average Return on Equity = 
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑃𝑒𝑟 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒
; 
calculated using profits and losses before taxes 
r: Average Cost of Capital (estimated as a WACC, see below) 
IC: Average Invested Capital (as per balance sheet, see below) 
 
𝐼𝐶 = 𝐹𝐴 + 𝐶𝐴 + 𝑂𝐶𝐴 − (𝐶𝐿 + 𝑂𝐶𝐿) (3) 
where 
IC: Average Invested Capital 
FA: Average Fixed Assets 
CA: Average Current Assets 
OCA: Average Other Current Assets 
CL: Average Current Liabilities 
OCL: Average Other Current Liabilities 
 
We reasonably assume that 0 ≤ Residual Income, that is, executive managers at least do 
not destroy shareholder value. Hence, we could rearrange equation (2) such that WACC can 
approximate r, by fitting the following OLS regression separately for originating and recruiting 
firms: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 x 𝐼𝐶 = 𝑟 𝐼𝐶 + 𝑒𝑖  (4) 
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Thus, ?̂? is a proxy of the cost of capital r in equation (2) and 𝑒𝑖 is the error term. Finally, 
we use the following proxy for the shareholder value of a firm: 
𝑆𝑉 =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴
?̂?
  (5) 
where EBITDA denotes earnings before interest taxes depreciation and amortization, 
which we use as an indicator of free cash flows from operations (Pike & Neale, 2011). The 
formulation in equation (5) works as an average value of operational cash flows realized in both 
periods assuming a ‘steady state’ (Dringoli, 2012). Observe that equation (2) is regarded as the 
proxy to managerial performance and equation (5) as the proxy to shareholder value.2 
Firm-level indicators of operational efficiency included operating surplus (operating 
revenue – total expenses) per employee and cost to operating revenue (total expenses/operating 
revenue), indicating opportunity costs of additional employees and units of revenue. Industry 
effects were tested by inclusion of two-digit NACE industrial classification codes for each 
originating and recruiting firm. We also included a peer group classification and a shareholder 
independence indicator, drawn from Orbis, to control for differences in corporate governance 
                                                
 
2 Because of the wide range in the managerial performance indicator, residual income, a ranked 
variable, was also used. This is consistent with a view that recruiters would simply seek to 
recruit from firms with higher residual income per se rather than specific levels of performance. 
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practices.3 Finally, we considered the executive’s years of tenure in the originating firm, beyond 
a 3-year minimum, as an indicator of the variable managerial skills, grounded on the axiomatic 
principle according to which the longer the experience, the better is the managerial decision 
skills (Henderson et al, 2006). 
3.4 Estimation 
Utilising the PNet implementation of ERGMs (Wang, Robins and Pattison, 2009), we 
tested a wide range of structural and selection variables as listed in the Appendix and Tables 4 
and 5. The discussion is, however, limited to the set of variables that converged to a model of the 
observed network. These are listed in Table 1. 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
Given that equation (1) denotes a probability model, as it is customary in any logistic 
regression, conditional odd ratios could be calculated using model estimates to have a 
more accurate assessment of response probabilities. However, this would make sense 
only under the assumption that ties compared are in an identical neighbourhood of ties, 
which might not be the case due to the inherent heterogeneity of relational data. For 
                                                
 
3 The peer group classification subdivides standard industrial classifications by firm size, very 
large firms within an industry generally characterized by more sophisticated governance 
mechanisms than smaller firms. The shareholder independence indicator considers the extent to 
which shareholding is concentrated among a few owners or more dispersed. 
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sake of exposition then, we follow the usual practice in ERGM analysis, which is to 
concentrate on examining agent-level behaviour by contrasting it with structural-level 
behaviour (see examples in Lusher, Koskinen and Robins, 2013, chps. 12–14). Table 2 
presents the results of the ERGM estimation, with the structural effects being essentially 
descriptive of the arcs from sender to receiver tending to originate or terminate without 
further structural precedent or consequence. 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
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3.5 Interaction Effects 
In models of dyadic-independence terms alone, it is possible to determine interaction 
effects. As ERGMs are logit models, coefficients comprise additions to logodds. The probability 
(logodds) of an edge existing in the network relative to all others is the sum of each change 
statistics times its coefficients. The change statistic is the amount by which any statistic in the 
model changes when the edge is added. For example, if we had dummy variables for industry 
and peer groups, the logodds of an edge between Industry1/PeerGroup1 and 
Industry1/PeerGroup2, with coefficients β1 to β4 for edges, Industry1, Peer Group1 and 
PeerGroup2, respectively, could be modelled as β1 (1) + β2 (2) + β3 (1) × β4 (1). 
However, in this application, we are estimating the probability of a network of the 
observed pattern existing, given the observed characteristics and interactions of its members. 
Therefore, interaction effects are subsumed within the estimates of more complex dyadic-
dependent interactions such as in- and out-stars, reciprocity and homophily. 
 
3.6 Goodness of fit of the ERGMs 
The overall model convergence statistics presented in Table 3 indicate that, in general, 
this is a very low-density network with a mean degree of 1, positively skewed both in-degree 
and out-degree wise, also with low in-degree and out-degree variability. The clustering 
coefficients for the higher-order patterns reflect the lack of network pattern (up to 0.5). 
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
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Goodness of fit statistics are reported in the Appendix (Tables 4 and 5). Note that 33 out 
of feasible 42 convergent structures (self-organizing patterns) might have arisen using the model 
estimated in Table 2. For firm-level attributes, 91 out of a possible total of 110 sub-graphs could 
have been represented by this model; in particular, 8 out of 10 feasible network patterns could be 
replicated by Legal and Accounting sender and 11 out of possible 13 by Change in Residual 
Income Ranking difference. This breakdown between structural- and firm-level attributes makes the 
model in Table 2 overall a good fit both endogenously and exogenously, but slightly better at the 
firm-attribute level than at the structural level. Namely, the ERGM estimate explains better 
exogenous network patterns, particularly when the firm of origin belongs to the Legal and 
Accounting economic activity of the NACE industrial classification. 
Nonetheless, even though Legal and Accounting sender is statistically significant, since 
Shareholder Value sender and Residual Income sender were not significant, we again did not find 
evidence in the case under study either in favour or against our research hypothesis, according to 
which when firms recruit executives from a particular economic activity or industry 
classification, it is because the underlying strategy is to enhance shareholder value via residual 
income generation as a way of emulating better performing firms. However, we are in a position 
to assert that executive managers belonging to ‘Legal and Accounting’ as the firm of origin 
prevailed as a network trigger. Namely, the fact of coming from a company that belonged to this 
industry division was enough to generate a managerial network among executives that changed 
jobs between ’06 and ’11. 
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3.7 Discussion of results 
We did not find support for our first hypotheses, and consequently for Fligstein (1990)’s 
theory of the shareholder value stage, at least from the viewpoint of executive managers’ 
recruitment. Nonetheless, our results support our second hypothesis, adding to the role of 
industry environment on human capital investment, for we find evidence in the UK case of firm-
level attributes in management recruitment, with predominance in candidate selection from legal 
and accounting consultancy activity. This outcome is compatible with the works of Kraatz and 
Moore (2002) in terms of complementary skills and with that of Datta and Rajagopalan (1998) 
regarding cognitive characteristics compatibility and that of Campbell, Coff, and Kryscynski 
(2012) because of complementary industry experience in times of increased uncertainty. 
Even though we have found evidence of the firm of origin’s influence in executive 
recruitment, in particular legal and accounting activity, this was not concomitant to either 
shareholder value enhancement or detriment. We have already mentioned executives in the 
professional services industry accumulate valuable knowledge since their interactions with a 
wide range of businesses allows them to scan the business environment, in many cases with 
participation in the development of specific business practices inside leading companies. 
Therefore, there is potential for a rich transfer of strategic and organizational knowledge in the 
short or medium term. Furthermore, in this paper we have shown that at least in the case under 
study, the firm of origin on its own is considered relevant in executive recruitment. 
Some of the limitations we faced concern the absence of dynamic parameters, since the 
study is bounded to one cohort of managers, which not only circumscribes the conceptual 
framework to the immediately previous employer but also restraints career path analysis. We 
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could think of the lack of evidence on the shareholder value transfer as a result of this data 
absence. As it becomes available, extensions then would involve designing a longitudinal study 
for the UK, with a wider set of covariates, as well as making international comparisons. This 
would be particularly useful for considering when firms seek executives from legal and 
accounting firms, potentially complementing studies noting the recruitment of directors from 
financial institutions in times of financial distress (Stearns & Mizruchi, 1993). Additionally, 
because of the relevance of industry classification aggregate effect, a proper statistical multilevel 
analysis could be carried out, provided a state-of-the-art network analysis was applied. 
 
4. Conclusion 
From this illustrative case, it can be seen that ERGMs provide an important set of 
techniques for the consideration of sophisticated drivers of network structure. Incorporating 
structural and selection variables alongside traditional parameters, the ERGM approach provides 
a very flexible method for exploring micro-sociological dynamics that are normally inaccessible 
to management researchers. The method also overcomes the traditional limitations in 
undertaking statistical analysis of highly interdependent data that, by definition, characterise 
networks. 
 In our case study, the ERGM modelling led us to reject our first hypothesis that 
firms target external executive hires from firms with relatively higher financial 
performance, as financial performance in shareholder value or residual income terms 
were not significantly related to sender or recruiting effects. However, the second 
hypothesis that firms recruit from industries exercising complementary capabilities was 
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supported with regard to legal and accounting origins. No meaningful structural effects 
were identified, a symptom of the limited cases and hence sparseness of the network. 
However, the method provides confidence in the findings due to the robustness of the 
modelling against autocorrelation and multicollinearity problems that arise with 
conventional regression analysis of highly interdependent data. 
 Even in their standard implementation, it can be seen that ERGMs provide a 
versatile platform for management researchers to make much more sophisticated use of 
the growing availability of network data than conventional methods allow. Emerging 
multi-level and longitudinal ERGMs offer promising extensions to engage with a wide 
range of problems in management research. 
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Table 1. Convergent variables 
Variable Description 
Structural variables  
2-outstar Two executives from the same originating firm move to two 
different recruiting firms. 
Arc Mean executive propensity to move to another firm. 
Sink Number of nodes with zero outdegree; executive leaves 
originating firm and no executive joins the originating firm. 
Source Number of nodes with zero indegree; executive joins recruiting 
firm and no executive leaves the recruiting firm. 
Firm-level variables  
Tenure sender Migrating executive’s tenure at the originating firm, in years 
beyond three. 
Industry homophily Originating and recruiting firms have the same industry 
classification. 
Legal and Accounting sender Originating firm is in legal and accounting industry (NACE 69) 
and recruiting firm is not. 
Wholesale and Retail Trade receiver Recruiting firm is in wholesale and retail trade industry (NACE 
47) and originating firm is not. 
Peer Group homophily Originating and recruiting firms have the same peer group 
classification. 
Shareholder Independence homophily Originating and recruiting firms have the same shareholder 
independence classification. 
Residual Income sender Originating firm’s residual income greater than that of 
recruiting firm. 
Change in Residual Income Ranking 
sender  
Increase in originating firm’s residual income rank 2006–11 
greater than that of recruiting firm. 
Change in Residual Income Ranking 
difference 
Change in originating firm’s residual income rank 2006–11 
differs from change in recruiting firm rank. 
Operating Surplus/Employee sender  Originating firm’s operating surplus per employee greater than 
that of recruiting firm. 
Operating Surplus/Employee difference Originating firm’s operating surplus per employee differs from 
that of recruiting firm. 
Cost/Revenue Ratio sender Originating firm’s operating costs/operating revenue ratio 
greater than that of recruiting firm. 
Cost/Revenue Ratio difference Originating firm’s operating costs/operating revenue ratio 
differs from that of recruiting firm. 
Shareholder Value sender Originating firm’s shareholder value greater than that of the 
recruiting firm. 
Shareholder Value receiver Recruiting firm’s shareholder value greater than that of the 
originating firm. 
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Shareholder Value difference Originating firm’s shareholder value differs from that of 
recruiting firm. 
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Table 2. ERGM Estimation 
Parameters 
 
Estimate 
 Standard 
error  (SE) 
Convergence 
statistic 
Structural     
2-outstar −0.19  0.21 0.04 
Arc −4.21 * 0.71 0.04 
Sink 0.79 * 0.73 0.01 
Source 3.22 * 0.74 0.02 
Firm-level     
Tenure sender 0.10  0.08 −0.01 
Industry homophily 0.21  0.65 −0.07 
Legal and Accounting sender 5.62 * 2.11 0.05 
Wholesale and Retail Trade receiver −1.95  1.05 −0.05 
Peer Group homophily 0.36  0.79 0.04 
Shareholder Independence homophily −0.28  0.42 −0.04 
Residual Income sender 0.09  0.10 0.06 
Change in Residual Income Ranking sender −0.18  0.13 0.05 
Change in Residual Income Ranking difference −0.12 * 0.06 0.02 
Operating Surplus per Employee sender −0.20  0.14 −0.01 
Operating Surplus per Employee difference −0.01  0.09 0.00 
Cost/Revenue Ratio sender -0.03  0.07 0.05 
Cost/Revenue Ratio difference 0.00  0.04 0.01 
Shareholder Value sender 0.14  0.11 0.02 
Shareholder Value receiver 0.03  0.07 0.03 
Shareholder Value difference −0.13  0.07 0.05 
 
* Significant at approximately p < 0.05 level  
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Table 3. Convergence statistics 
 
Global Clustering Coefficients 
Cto       0.00253 
Cti       0.01471 
Ctm     0.50000 
Ccm     0.00000 
AKC-T     0.50000 
AKC-D      0.00261 
AKC-U     0.01709 
AKC-C      0.00000 
 
Other Convergence Statistics 
Digraph Density       0.01815 
Standard deviation of indegree  distribution   1.075493 
Skewness of indegree   distribution   1.014203 
Standard deviation of outdegree distribution   2.628892 
Skewness of outdegree   distribution   3.664220 
Corr. Coef. between in- and outdegree distributions  −0.366304 
Mean degree        1.03448 
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Table 4. Goodness of Fit Parameters Selection-Structure 
Structural Variable Count Mean S.E. GoF 
inAout-star(2.00) 4.00 4.19 3.44 −0.06 
2-in-star 34.00 29.74 7.74 0.55 
2-out-star 168.00 169.02 32.03 −0.03 
3-in-star 17.00 9.61 6.60 1.12 
3-out-star 532.00 512.61 161.04 0.12 
A2P-D(2.00) 168.00 165.37 30.78 0.09 
A2P-DU(2.00) 101.00 96.10 16.21 0.30 
A2P-T(2.00) 4.00 8.61 10.17 −0.45 
A2P-TD(2.00) 86.00 86.99 16.87 −0.06 
A2P-TDU(2.00) 68.67 66.94 11.84 0.15 
A2P-TU(2.00) 19.00 17.72 6.52 0.20 
A2P-U(2.00) 34.00 26.83 6.90 1.04 
Ain1out-star(2.00) 3.50 6.84 7.61 −0.44 
AinAout-star(2.00) 3.50 3.22 2.43 0.12 
AinS(2.00) 26.50 25.44 5.53 0.19 
AoutS(2.00) 57.02 58.92 6.54 −0.29 
arc 58.00 58.04 3.70 −0.01 
AT-D(2.00) 0.00 1.02 1.49 −0.69 
AT-DU(2.00) 0.00 0.92 1.26 −0.73 
AT-T(2.00) 0.00 1.03 1.52 −0.68 
AT-TD(2.00) 0.00 1.03 1.50 −0.68 
AT-TDU(2.00) 0.00 0.96 1.34 −0.71 
AT-TU(2.00) 0.00 0.92 1.27 −0.72 
AT-U(2.00) 0.00 0.81 1.07 −0.76 
Isolates 0.00 1.15 1.03 −1.11 
path2 4.00 8.64 10.22 −0.45 
reciprocity 0.00 0.02 0.13 −0.14 
Sink 34.00 34.07 2.12 −0.03 
Source 21.00 20.82 2.06 0.09 
T5 0.00 0.02 0.19 −0.08 
T7 0.00 0.04 0.32 −0.12 
T8 0.00 0.21 1.90 −0.11 
T9(030T) 0.00 1.04 1.53 −0.68 
 
Note. For specification of structural variables, see Appendix B of Wang, Robbins and Pattison 
(2009). 
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Table 5. Goodness of Fit Parameters Selection-Attributes 
 Count Mean S.E GoF 
Shareholder Value difference 165.01 166.06 18.55 −0.06 
Shareholder Value reciprocity 135.76 135.81 0.50 −0.12 
Shareholder Value in2star 100.68 93.37 33.96 0.22 
Shareholder Value out2star 855.87 797.70 159.60 0.36 
Shareholder Value path2 25.31 39.68 52.15 −0.28 
Shareholder Value product 695.98 698.62 96.97 −0.03 
Shareholder Value reciprocity 628.82 629.22 3.17 −0.13 
Shareholder Value Receiver 156.32 155.55 20.27 0.05 
Shareholder Value Sender 238.79 250.12 20.76 −0.06 
Shareholder Value sum 395.12 395.56 31.51 −0.01 
Shareholder Value sum reciprocity 351.57 351.75 1.32 −0.13 
Change in Residual Income Rank difference 157.20 157.50 21.80 −0.01 
Change in Residual Income Rank difference reciprocity 123.51 123.55 0.55 −0.07 
Change in Residual Income Rank 2path 11.55 27.55 59.00 −0.27 
Change in Residual Income Rank product 595.06 562.31 82.91 0.38 
Change in Residual Income Rank reciprocity 581.85 582.10 3.56 −0.07 
Change in Residual Income Rank Receiver 118.70 109.88 17.07 0.52 
Change in Residual Income Rank Sender 181.32 181.08 18.55 0.01 
Change in Residual Income Rank sum 300.01 290.96 26.32 0.35 
Change in Residual Income Rank sum reciprocity 262.08 262.18 1.08 −0.09 
Legal and Accounting activity reciprocity 0.00 0.01 0.11 −0.12 
Legal and Accounting in2star 0.00 0.19 0.77 −0.25 
Legal and Accounting interaction 0.00 0.29 0.57 −0.50 
Legal and Accounting interaction reciprocity 0.00 0.01 0.08 −0.08 
Legal and Accounting out2star 163.00 161.55 32.15 0.05 
Legal and Accounting 2path 0.00 5.85 9.50 −0.51 
Legal and Accounting Receiver 0.00 0.55 0.87 −0.52 
Legal and Accounting Sender 32.00 32.05 3.09 −0.02 
Residual Income difference 212.35 205.05 21.08 0.35 
Residual Income difference reciprocity 202.09 202.16 0.63 −0.11 
Residual Income in2star 7.78 12.68 15.95 −0.31 
Residual Income out2star 1001.33 922.58 193.55 0.51 
Residual Income 2path 13.17 30.85 59.59 −0.30 
Residual Income product 75.53 82.01 53.52 −0.12 
Residual Income product reciprocity 62.78 62.97 3.11 −0.06 
Residual Income Receiver 18.02 21.68 13.36 −0.27 
Residual Income Sender 195.93 196.57 20.82 −0.03 
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Residual Income sum 213.95 218.16 22.29 −0.19 
Residual Income reciprocity 211.53 211.55 1.07 −0.11 
 
Note. For interpretation of the selection effects on these variables, see the discussion in section 
2. For a full specification, see Appendix B of Wang, Robbins and Pattison (2009). 
 
  
Exponential random graph models for management research 
 
 
42 
 
 
Figure 1. Examples of structural and dyadic selection variables 
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i) Difference j) Sum k) Product l) 2-path 
 
Source: Adapted from Wang, Robins and Pattison (2009) 
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Figure 2. All network components 
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Figure 3. Main component 
  
 
 
 
 
